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tempts the reviewer to go on indefinitely. Much might be said on the question whether a socialism which leaves so many things undecided can be "ultimately a moral and intellectual synthesis of mankind," even though it is added, "from which fresh growth may come." If we are to take certain limitations of conception as final, and not merely as part of the formulation of a compromise, then socialism is reduced entirely to a system of economic readjustments, and cannot claim to be a general synthesis at all. Is the form of the state, for example, indifferent? Is the expectation serious that popular religion will be much the same after as before the transition? If so, then I do not find the socialistic reorganization radical enough.

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London.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF RELIGION. A Series of Lectures by John Watson, M. A., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queens University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. Pp. 485.

The lectures which constitute the body of this work are mainly essays in the reconstruction and history of religious belief. The author believes that "nothing short of a complete revision of current theological ideas can bring permanent satisfaction to our highly reflective age"; and "that the theology of the future must take the form of a philosophy of religion" (Preface.) This work is not, however, in the full sense, a philosophy of religion. There is no systematic inquiry as to what religion is, on what it depends and the place it occupies or should occupy in human life.

In the first chapter it is pointed out that religion contains three distinguishable but inseparable elements. It is at once a life, a creed and a ritual. Very little is said about ritual; the relation of life and creed is discussed at some length, and the contention is, that religion is a life nourished and sustained by beliefs which are fundamentally true. True beliefs must be capable of being formulated into a definite system of ideas; and the only reasonable basis of religion is a system of metaphysics. Professor Watson does not say, with Dr. McTaggart, that no man is justified in a religious attitude except as a result of metaphysical study. He agrees with Newman that the religious

consciousness is not created by dogma. Faith precedes and is the condition of dogma; and the development of faith comes largely through the influence of men of religious genius. But he contends that faith is enriched by a reflective formulation of its own principle. What leads men "to look at all systematic thought about religion as doing violence to its original simplicity and power is mainly a confusion between dogma in the sense of a number of propositions based upon external authority, and a reasoned doctrine which claims no other support than its own inherent truth" (p. 7). This is true, but it is not the chief reason why a large class of thinkers rightly or wrongly distrust dogma both in the sense of a "number of propositions based upon external authority" and as a "reasoned doctrine." To many metaphysical construction appears as an attempt to put together abstractions, and attention to it means neglect of the concrete and personal which alone can inspire a living faith. On the one hand it is claimed that the right Christian method is to aim at assimilating the life to Christ's, to identify the self with Him, so that the whole relation to God, man and nature may be the same as His. On the other hand it is maintained that "we cannot state the 'doctrine' of Jesus; for it appears as a supramundane life which must be felt in the person of Jesus, and its truth is guaranteed by the fact that such a life can be lived" (Harnack, "History of Dogma," Vol. I, Ch. 2). Professor Watson discusses the views of Harnack, but he does not fairly face the problem whether there can be any valid reason for faith or any criterion of religious value which is not metaphysical. He emphasizes throughout the necessity of a true interpretation of the universe as the condition of the religious life. The "undeveloped intuitions" of Jesus must be expanded to the completeness of modern constructive idealism (p. 188). "We now recognize that while Christianity is based on a universal principle, that principle is not capable of being imprisoned in a few simple truths, but just because it is a living thing must be enriched by all the elements with which it comes in contact. To identify Christianity with its first simple form and reject its later developments merely because they are later, is as unjustifiable as to prefer the germ to the full-grown plant" (pp. 255, 256). In order to show in a concrete way the process by which religious thought has been gradually purified and enriched, Professor Watson gives us studies on Philo and

the New Testament, the Gnostics, Augustine's Theology, Medieval Theology, and on Liebnitz and Protestant Theology. He examines also the attempts made to base religion on authority, and criticises the views of several modern philosophical writers whose views differ from his own.

The chief value of the book lies in its criticisms. It is well written, the style is clear and untechnical, and anyone who is interested in the philosophical basis of religion will find it worth reading.

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THE PRECINCT OF RELIGION IN THE CULTURE OF HUMANITY. By Professor Charles Gray Shaw, B. D., Ph. D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1908. Pp. i, 279.

This book "contains the substance of the lectures delivered in the Graduate School of New York University in the course entitled Philosophy of Religion." The author claims to have set aside in these lectures both metaphysics and psychology "for the sake of a humanism which seems best adapted to defining the essence of human worship." Who will be able to read this announcement without a start? Humanism in religion without psychology! The central doctrine is that religious consciousness possesses an independent nature and a self-constituted character. Four parts of about equal length make up the book: (1) The essence of religion, (2) the character of religion, (3) the reality of religion, (4) the religious world-order.

The reviewer cannot share the satisfaction which the author no doubt feels at having succeeded in excluding psychology almost completely from his treatment of religion. And he regrets having to record another achievement of the author as unfortunate as the first: the rich stores recently added to their respective sciences by the students of anthropology and of primitive religions have remained unused.

The result of this voluntary exclusion, or ignorance, is the production of a volume as formal, remote from religious life, and therefore unprofitable, as any we have seen for a long time.

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